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In 2010, Chinese oil companies spent more than $15 billion on upstream deals in Latin America,
including Sinopec's December acquisition of Occidental Petroleum's Argentine operations for
$2.45 billion, and analysts expect that the trend will continue. What would be the effects of
China's continued prominence in Latin America's oil and gas sectors? Which countries and
companies in the region are Chinese investors most significantly interested in and how do they
differ from other foreign companies' investment strategies? How will China's increasing profile
in the region affect Latin American political and economic policies?
A: Paul Isbell, visiting senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue:
"China's energy demand will grow dramatically in the coming years, making it the
world's largest oil importer sometime within a few decades. This trend nearly guarantees that
Chinese companies will continue to secure hydrocarbon assets around the world. But Chinese
companies have already been turned away from the U.S. market, as Congress made it clear it
would not allow CNOOC to buy Unocal back in 2005. Furthermore, certain obvious partners for
China-like Russia, Iran or Venezuela-may prove to be too volatile and unpredictable with respect
to access, taxes, royalties and legal security. In this context, it makes sense that the Chinese
would seek out the energy-rich states of the Southern Cone. It is here where a more amenable
equilibrium (particularly in terms of policy stability, stable incentives for development and
predictable investment security) might still be achieved between oil-producing states and foreign
oil companies. Brazil's on-going modifications to its energy legislation suggest that it is headed
precisely toward such an equilibrium in fiscal and access terms. Meanwhile, Argentina will
likely attempt to seduce foreign companies-including those from China-back into the exploration
and production game by developing more attractive terms than those that have made available in
recent times. Indeed, the Southern Cone appears to be the one subregion of Latin America most
uniquely suited to a deepening investment partnership with China, both within the energy sector
and beyond."
A: Jiang Shixue, professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and vice
president of the Chinese Association of Latin American Studies in Beijing:
"One of the major problems for Latin America's energy sector is a lack of capital. China
needs energy from external sources and seems to have enough funds for its 'going out strategy.'

Therefore, China's presence in Latin America's energy sector should be a welcome sign. China's
presence would make Latin America's energy sector more competitive, and this is favorable for
the region as it will acquire a better position of bargaining with foreign energy companies,
including those from China. Regarding the question of which countries and companies in the
region Chinese investors are most significantly interested in, it seems that China has no special
preference for certain countries or companies. Wherever there is oil or gas, there is the
possibility of Chinese entry. Whether in Latin America or elsewhere, China is a late-comer.
Consequently, it is extremely hard for China to set up an energy company with 100 percent
ownership. Thus, the best way to enter would seem to be the traditional merger and acquisition.
In the process of 'going out' to Latin America, China needs to deal with two issues: one from the
west and the other from Latin America. In the age of globalization, cooperation in the energy
sector is no strange thing. Some people in the West tend to believe that energy in Latin America
or Africa is 'ours.' This kind of selfish mentality is not correct. The West should not look at
China's presence in Latin America's energy sector as a threat. In some Latin American countries,
policy uncertainty surrounding its energy sector, along with some other obstacles in the region's
investment climate, is not a small issue. This issue will definitely pose hardships for Chinese
energy companies."
A: Roger Tissot, independent energy economist:
"Chinese investments in Latin America have evolved from hype to reality. During the
early years of this decade, as China's rise started to make headlines and commodity prices moved
higher, Latin America started to finally pay attention to China. Countries that highlighted China's
importance were usually those such as Venezuela which, for political reasons, were also trying to
reduce their dependency from the United States. Countries more closely aligned to the United
States were slower and generally more cautious about China's investments. For China, the issue
was not about geopolitics or the erroneous idea of replacing one 'imperial power' for another, but
rather a quest for commodities to ensure its rapid industrialization process. Since Venezuela
contains one of the largest oil reserves in the world, China's presence in that country will have
important geopolitical and market implications. As Alejandro Grisanti points out, Venezuela
could increase output by 1 million barrels per day by 2016, a clear reversal of the trend observed
since Chávez was elected president. If we take into account Chinese capital and technology and
the clear urgency to reverse production decline, the forecasts become much more credible; giving
a much-needed second life to Chávez's administration. Now that Ecuador has settled its contract
negotiations with foreign oil companies, Chinese investments may resume and help output
increase in that country, too. In short, Chinese investments have and will continue to play a very
important role as substitutes to large IOC's that grew wary of political risks in Latin America.
The question is if Chinese investments are aligned with Latin American industrialization
strategies. After years of neglect, Latin American countries are rediscovering the importance of
industrialization policies, and the need to establish stronger linkages between their extractive
industries and the rest of the economy."
A: Jeremy Martin, director of the energy program at the Institute of the Americas:
"China has developed a strategy to deal with spiking demand and insufficient domestic
production, which is focused globally on securing access to reserves, promoting increased oil
production and diversifying its supply sources. Recently in Latin America, the strategy relied
heavily upon China's economic windfall to provide oil credit swaps ranging from $1 billion in

Ecuador to $10 billion in Brazil and $20 billion in Venezuela. More recent Chinese activity
points to a longer-term investment strategy. Indeed, Chinese national oil companies (NOCs)
fanned out across Latin America in search of direct access to reserves and production by way of
partnerships and acquisitions. In many ways, their efforts are much like international oil
companies. But it is clear that their decision-making is heavily influenced by Beijing's
geopolitical strategy and composed of factors that are uniquely Chinese. These include less
rigorous profit expectations, a greater willingness to not be deterred by high levels of political
and local market risks and, some say, a relative lack of concern about issues of the environment
and corporate social responsibility. The recent Chinese high-value acquisitions in Argentina have
placed that nation alongside Venezuela and Brazil as ground zero for Chinese oil interest in the
region. But the Argentina deals differ and move away from what seemed to be China's oil credit
swap inclination. At the same time, they also underscore that Chinese NOCs are hewing to
Beijing's prioritization of reserve access and diversity of supply over more traditional evaluations
that might not have viewed the vagaries of the Argentine market with such optimism.
Diversification of supply remains an unchanged linchpin. China's clear priorities coupled with
the resources of its firms are surely adding some new wrinkles to oil deals in the region-if not
slowly altering the landscape altogether. China is likely to increase its Latin activism and be on
the lookout for more acquisitions for the foreseeable future."

The Energy Advisor welcomes responses to this Q&A. Readers can write editor Gene Kuleta at
kuleta@thedialogue.org with comments.

